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CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT: GUN RIGHTS 
OUTSIDE THE HOME 
JOSEPH BLOCHER, JACOB D. CHARLES & DARRELL A. H. MILLER* 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
Over the past few decades, the right to keep and bear arms has been on the 
move. Most notably, it has stepped from the realm of pure politics into the world 
of positive law.1 Where once the right to keep and bear arms operated primarily 
as a political slogan, it is now an operational, oft-litigated constitutional right—
albeit one still facing important questions of scope and strength. In making its 
transformation, the right to keep and bear arms has presented courts and scholars 
with new questions about the constitutionality of gun regulation. The answers to 
those questions vary depending on where those regulations apply, including 
perhaps most importantly whether they restrict the keeping of arms to the home. 
Understanding the “geography” of the Second Amendment is therefore a central 
challenge for courts and scholars—a challenge that this symposium addresses. 
As with so many other questions of gun rights and regulation, the starting 
point is the Supreme Court’s 2008 decision in District of Columbia v. Heller.2 It 
was Heller that effectuated the transition of the right to keep and bear arms from 
a powerful political and cultural force into a matter of constitutional doctrine. 
That of course did not end the political debate over gun rights and regulation. 
But after Heller, the debate is a matter for the courts as well. In the first decade 
after the Supreme Court’s decision, they resolved more than 1,000 Second 
Amendment challenges.3 
Those challenges involve many different dimensions of the right to keep and 
bear arms, including who can claim it, what weapons it covers, and how the 
government can regulate the people and weapons that are not categorically 
excluded. Heller tells us that “felons” are excluded from Second Amendment 
 
* Lanty L. Smith ’67 Professor of Law, Duke Law School; Lecturing Fellow and Executive Director of 
the Center for Firearms Law at Duke Law School; Melvin G. Shimm Professor of Law, Duke Law School. 
We are grateful to the participants for their superb contributions and to the editors of Law & 
Contemporary Problems for their assistance in bringing this symposium to fruition.  
 1.  For an overview of that transformation and some thoughts on its implications going forward, see 
JOSEPH BLOCHER & DARRELL A. H. MILLER, THE POSITIVE SECOND AMENDMENT: RIGHTS, 
REGULATION, AND THE FUTURE OF HELLER (2018). 
 2.  554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 3.  See Eric Ruben & Joseph Blocher, From Theory to Doctrine: An Empirical Analysis of the Right 
to Keep and Bear Arms After Heller, 67 DUKE L.J. 1433, 1471–73 (2018). 
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coverage.4 What about those who commit domestic violence misdemeanors?5 
Heller indicates that “dangerous and unusual” (or perhaps “dangerous or 
unusual”6) weapons can be prohibited, and equates that category with those that 
are not “in common use.”7 What does it mean for a weapon to be in “common 
use,” and what constitutional significance should that have?8 Heller notes that the 
right to carry a gun does not include a right to do so for any reason whatsoever.9 
What power do cities and states have to require that a person show reasons (or 
“good cause”) to carry a gun in public?10 These are central questions for Second 
Amendment litigation, and scholars have, in turn, provided doctrinal, historical, 
and empirical analysis. 
But there is another way to think about the intersection between gun rights 
and regulation, which is by focusing on where they come into contact. Perhaps 
more so than most constitutional rights, Second Amendment questions are space-
sensitive—the interests underlying the right, and the governmental interests in 
regulation, can both vary depending on location. Whether a particular law is 
constitutional depends in part on where it applies. Can the government prohibit 
guns in post offices and their adjoining parking lots?11 In and around Capitol 
Hill?12 On airplanes?13 Methodologically, how are courts and scholars supposed 
to address such questions? 
 
 4.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626–27. 
 5.  See, e.g., Stimmel v. Sessions, 879 F.3d 198, 212 (6th Cir. 2018) (upholding a federal ban on 
firearms possession by those who have committed misdemeanor crimes of domestic violence); United 
States v. Chovan, 735 F.3d 1127, 1140–41 (9th Cir. 2013) (same); United States v. White, 593 F.3d 1199, 
1205–06 (11th Cir. 2010) (same); United States v. Skoien, 614 F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc) 
(same). 
 6.  Compare Heller, 554 U.S. at 627 (referring to “dangerous and unusual” weapons), with id. at 623 
(referring to “dangerous or unusual” weapons).  
 7.  Id. at 624, 627. 
 8.  See, e.g., Kolbe v. Hogan, 849 F.3d 114, 135–36 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc), cert. denied, 138 S. Ct. 
469 (2017) (citations omitted); Eugene Volokh, Implementing the Right to Keep and Bear Arms for Self-
Defense: An Analytical Framework and a Research Agenda, 56 UCLA L. REV. 1443, 1480 (2009).  
 9.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626 (citations omitted) (“From Blackstone through the 19th-century cases, 
commentators and courts routinely explained that the right was not a right to keep and carry any weapon 
whatsoever in any manner whatsoever and for whatever purpose.”). 
 10.  See infra notes 27–28; Joseph Blocher, Good Cause Requirements for Carrying Guns in Public, 
127 HARV. L. REV. F. 218 (2014). 
 11.  Bonidy v. U.S. Postal Serv., 790 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2015). Notably, the panel in Bonidy divided, 
in part, based on the level of generality at which the place-based restriction should be evaluated. In his 
partial concurrence, Judge Tymkovich argued that “the government has not shown that successfully 
combating potential crime at this location—a run-of-the-mill post office parking lot in a Colorado ski 
town—hinges on restricting the Second Amendment rights of lawfully licensed firearms carriers.” Id. at 
1129 (Tymkovich, J., concurring in part). The majority rejected this as too much tailoring: “To require 
the USPS to tailor a separate gun policy for each of its properties or indeed for its many diverse customers 
would present an impossible burden not required by the intermediate scrutiny test.” Id. at 1127. 
 12.  United States v. Class, 930 F.3d 460 (D.C. Cir. 2019). 
 13.  United States v. Davis, 304 F. App’x 473, 474 (9th Cir. 2008). The regulation of firearms on 
airplanes presents a particular difficulty for historically minded approaches to the Second Amendment, 
because Congress did not enact such a prohibition until the 1960s. See Act of Sept. 5, 1961, Pub. L. No. 
87-197, 75 Stat. 466.  
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As a general matter, there is nothing unusual about tailoring constitutional 
rights based on location, such that a regulation which is unconstitutional in one 
location might be constitutional elsewhere.14 Evaluation of time, place, and 
manner restrictions, to take one example, focuses on where those restrictions 
apply.15 The constitutionality of a stop and frisk depends in part on where it is 
performed.16 Fundamental constitutional rights—whether it is the right to vote, 
or to engage in consensual sexual activity—can be limited to particular places 
without so much as a whisper of constitutional objection. 
Perhaps the most notable division is that between public and private. Most 
constitutional rights or interests are especially resistant to governmental 
regulation when exercised in the home. The First Amendment’s treatment of 
obscenity is perhaps the obvious example here—such material can be possessed 
in the home, but prohibited elsewhere.17 But the answer need not always be 
binary; sometimes the privacy of the home is simply one factor weighing against 
the constitutionality of a regulation.18 
The right to keep and bear arms presents these questions about location-
sensitivity in particularly complex but important ways. First, Heller makes it clear 
that location does matter—the constitutionality of a gun regulation depends in 
part on where it applies. This is implicit in the majority’s holding that the Second 
Amendment does not extend to “sensitive places such as schools and government 
buildings . . . .”19 But what exactly makes a place sensitive remains an issue of 
doctrinal and scholarly debate.20 
The majority also says that the “core” interest protected by the Second 
Amendment—that of self-defense21—is “most acute” the home.22 This tracks 
 
 14.  This is true even if one zooms out to the jurisdictional level, as federal constitutional rights vary 
in their particulars—sometimes in surprising ways—depending on local facts. See, e.g., Joseph Blocher, 
Disuniformity of Federal Constitutional Rights, ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2020); Brandon L. Garrett, 
Local Evidence in Constitutional Interpretation, 104 CORNELL L. REV. 855 (2019). 
 15.  Frisby v. Schultz, 487 U.S. 474, 480–81 (1988). 
 16.  Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 124 (2000). 
 17.  See generally Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557 (1969) (establishing constitutional protection for 
private possession of obscene materials). For an examination of how that doctrine could apply to the 
Second Amendment, see Darrell A. H. Miller, Guns as Smut: Defending the Home-Bound Second 
Amendment, 109 COLUM. L. REV. 1278, 1280 (2009) (arguing for “a robust right in the home, subject to 
near-plenary restriction by elected government officials everywhere else”). 
 18.  See, e.g., Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562 (2003) (“In our tradition the State is not 
omnipresent in the home.”); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485–86 (1965) (“Would we allow the 
police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? 
The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”).  
 19.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 626.  
 20.  For two recent efforts to address that question, see David B. Kopel & Joseph G.S. Greenlee, 
The “Sensitive Places” Doctrine: Locational Limits on the Right to Bear Arms, 13 CHARLESTON L. REV. 
205 (2018); Darrell A. H. Miller, Sensitive Places and Constitutional Conflict, 28 WM. & MARY BILL R. 
J. 459 (2019). 
 21.  Heller, 554 U.S. at 630; id. at 599 (“central component”). 
 22.  Id. at 628 (noting that the D.C. handgun law “extends . . . to the home, where the need for 
defense of self, family, and property is most acute”). 
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traditional principles of self-defense law, which treated the home as one’s castle23 
and which (even after the expansion of self-defense rules in the United States 
over the past century) still accord heightened protection to self-defense in one’s 
house.24 On the other hand, the right to engage in self-defense is not limited to 
the home. After all, “the interest in self-protection is as great outside as inside 
the home[,]”25 which might suggest that the right to bear arms in public is “on 
par” with the right to do so in the home.26 
As a practical matter, these issues are central to litigation about public carry 
restrictions. As noted above, some jurisdictions require a person to show “good 
cause” (or some equivalent) before carrying a weapon in public. And while such 
restrictions have overwhelmingly been upheld,27 Second Amendment challengers 
have seen more success in this area than any other.28 
Furthermore, though most courts have either held or assumed that the right 
to keep and bear arms extends outside the home, they have not said much about 
why and how the right operates in public—nor has the Supreme Court weighed 
in on the matter. It is no exaggeration, then, to say that the single most important 
substantive debate in Second Amendment litigation and scholarship is whether 
and how the right to keep and bear arms extends outside the home. 
Resolving that debate will require engagement with a wide range of doctrinal, 
empirical, and historical sources—precisely what the contributions to this 
symposium seek to provide. 
One set of the articles addresses cases of constitutional conflict, of potential 
collisions more likely to arise outside the home than within it. Gregory Magarian, 
for example, argues that widespread rights to public carry can threaten robust 
free speech rights.29 He suggests that in public “guns far more commonly impede 
 
 23.  See 3 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *288 (“Every man’s house is looked upon by 
the law to be his castle.”); 3 EDWARD COKE, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *162 (“A 
man’s house is his castle—for where shall a man be safe if it be not in his house?”). 
 24.  United States v. Masciandaro, 638 F.3d 458, 470 (4th Cir. 2011) (citations omitted) (“[A]s we 
move outside the home, firearm rights have always been more limited, because public safety interests 
often outweigh individual interests in self-defense.”). 
 25.  Moore v. Madigan, 702 F.3d 933, 941 (7th Cir. 2012); see Volokh, supra note 8, at 1515 (“[S]elf-
defense has to take place wherever the person happens to be. Nearly any prohibition on having arms for 
self-defense in a particular place . . . is a substantial burden on the right to bear arms for self-defense.”). 
But see Masciandaro, 638 F.3d at 475 (4th Cir. 2011) (“The notion that ‘self-defense has to take place 
wherever [a] person happens to be,’ appears to us to portend all sorts of litigation over schools, airports, 
parks, public thoroughfares, and various additional government facilities. . . . The whole matter strikes 
us as a vast terra incognita that courts should enter only upon necessity and only then by small degree.”) 
(alteration in original) (citing Volokh, supra note 8, at 1515).  
 26.  See Wrenn v. District of Columbia, 864 F.3d 650, 663 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“[T]he rights to keep and 
bear arms are on equal footing— . . . the law must leave responsible, law-abiding citizens some reasonable 
means of exercising each.”). 
 27.  See, e.g., Gould v. Morgan, 907 F.3d 659 (1st Cir. 2018); Peruta v. San Diego, 824 F.3d 919 (9th 
Cir. 2016) (en banc); Drake v. Filko, 724 F.3d 426 (3d Cir. 2013); Woollard v. Gallagher, 712 F.3d 865 
(4th Cir. 2013); Kachalsky v. Cty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
 28.  Ruben & Blocher, supra note 3, at 1484–85. See, e.g., Wrenn, 864 F.3d at 666–67 (D.C. Cir. 2017) 
(striking down Washington, D.C.’s good-cause concealed carry licensing standard).   
 29.  Gregory P. Magarian, Conflicting Reports: When Gun Rights Threaten Free Speech, 83 LAW & 
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and chill free speech than protect or promote it.”30 He describes the ways these 
conflicts occur in public protests, at public universities, and in debates over the 
privacy interests of gun owners. Ultimately, he suggests, when free speech rights 
and Second Amendment rights do come into conflict, the former ought to prevail. 
Pursuing a similar theme, Josh Blackman describes the battle over 3D-printed 
firearms and the First Amendment interests at stake in government attempts to 
regulate the internet files that could be used to print these guns.31 Describing a 
right “to code and share arms,” Blackman chronicles his role as counsel for 
Defense Distributed, the company at the center of various governmental and 
private efforts to enjoin posting files for 3D-printed guns on the internet. 
Blackman challenges free-speech advocates to support Defense Distributed the 
same as they would any other individual or entity seeking to freely share legal 
material on the web. 
Mary Anne Franks also raises questions about the interactions between the 
Second Amendment right and other rights and interests.32 She argues that 
activists for a robust right to keep and bear arms seek the same kind of “safe 
spaces” and other protections for arms-bearing that they often criticize college 
students for seeking in debates over “triggering” speech. But, unlike the latter, 
the gun-rights activists’ claims are not mostly benign; Franks argues, “[the gun 
rights movement’s] demand for Second Amendment safe spaces poses a far 
graver threat to society than even the most intemperate demands of overly 
sensitive college students.”33 
A second set of articles focuses on regulating places, products, and people, 
and how these firearm regulations affect the Second Amendment right outside 
the home. Brannon Denning describes how a right to travel armed arises not just 
from the Second Amendment, but from the synergy of multiple constitutional 
guarantees.34 These “hybrid rights”—here the right to keep and bear arms and 
the constitutional right to travel—should have resulted in the New York rule at 
issue in New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. City of New York 
(NYSRPA)35 “being subject to more searching scrutiny than that applied by the 
Second Circuit.”36 He concludes that a restriction so severe as to limit the right to 
travel armed except in narrow circumstances like those at issue in NYSRPA likely 
violates this hybrid right. 
Robert Spitzer outlines the historical regulation of assault weapons, 
 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 169.  
 30.  Id. at 169.  
 31.  Josh Blackman, The Right to Code and Share Arms, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, 
at 1. 
 32.  Mary Anne Franks, The Second Amendment’s Safe Space, or The Constitutionalization of 
Fragility, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 137.  
 33.  Id. at 155.  
 34.  Brannon P. Denning, Have Gun—Will Travel?, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 97.   
 35.  883 F.3d 45 (2d Cir. 2018), vacated as moot, 140 S. Ct. 1525 (2020) (per curiam). 
 36.  Denning, supra note 34, at 98.  
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magazines, and silencers.37 He observes that “[r]ecent analyses of the history of 
gun laws in America have excavated a surprisingly rich, diverse, and prolific 
number and variety of gun laws, extending back to the country’s beginnings.”38 
This rich history, Spitzer shows, included extensive regulation of weapon types 
and magazine capacity, as well as firearm accessories like silencers. 
Jacob Charles discusses not whether guns can get outside the home, but who 
can bring them there, or indeed who can possess them at all.39 Charles argues 
that, as some jurists have recently suggested, people should not be treated the 
same as arms or activities when considering Second Amendment coverage. Most 
groups of people should be considered within the scope of the right, with rights 
that are defeasible only if the government can satisfy some form of means-end 
scrutiny. But not all classes of persons are the same, and some—like children and 
(perhaps) undocumented immigrants—might fall outside the scope of the right 
altogether. 
A third set of articles engages the empirical and theoretical debates regarding 
firearms outside the home. John Pepper and Megan Miller describe the 
methodological variation among studies of the effects of stand-your-ground laws 
on violent crime.40 Pepper and Miller report their conclusions using both strong 
and weak assumptions, showing that these choices can lead to starkly different 
results. On their preferred model, they find that stand-your-ground laws increase 
violent crime and murder. 
John Donohue argues that more guns in public leads to more crime.41 He 
records the quick and comprehensive movement over the last several decades 
that has expanded public carry of firearms, often with little or no restriction. 
Marshalling recent empirical research, he contends that the evidence shows that 
expanded and loosened public carry laws have an undesirable social impact and 
that courts should take this data into account when adjudicating Second 
Amendment claims. 
Nicholas Johnson describes the “defiance impulse” that will likely lead 
millions of otherwise law-abiding Americans to ignore or defy restrictive 
concealed-carry laws.42 He argues that, given that widespread defiance is likely to 
occur, an enforcement regime against such a common practice is likely to result 
in racial disparities in implementation. 
 
 37.  Robert J. Spitzer, Gun Accessories and the Second Amendment: Assault Weapons, Magazines, 
and Silencers, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 231.  
 38.  Id. at 232.  
 39.  Jacob D. Charles, Defeasible Second Amendment Rights: Conceptualizing Gun Laws That 
Dispossess Prohibited Persons, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 53.  
 40.  Megan Miller & John Pepper, Assessing the Effect of Firearms Regulations Using Partial 
Identification Methods: A Case Study of the Impact of Stand Your Ground Laws on Violent Crime, 83 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 213.  
 41.  John J. Donohue, The Swerve to “Guns Everywhere”: A Legal and Empirical Evaluation, 83 
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 117.  
 42.  Nicholas J. Johnson, Defiance, Concealed Carry, and Race, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 
2020, at 159. 
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Finally, the last compilation of articles discusses the history of a right to keep 
and bear arms outside the home. Saul Cornell excavates and explains the 
historical restrictions on traveling with firearms that existed both prior to and in 
the decades after the Second Amendment’s ratification.43 He argues that modern 
gun-rights advocates have read a libertarian right into a Founding-era culture 
that often erected strict barriers to travelling armed. 
Joyce Lee Malcolm, on the other hand, reports a historical record that 
broadly permitted public carry, including traveling with firearms.44 She argues 
that the English duty to be armed—which in many cases necessarily took place 
outside the home—is a crucial backdrop for the founding generation’s 
understanding of the right to carry arms in public. 
In his contribution, Jud Campbell approaches the issue from a different 
angle.45 He describes the Founding-era conceptions of rights, which distinguished 
between natural and positive rights, and the impact that distinction should have 
on how we implement the Second Amendment right. He urges courts and 
commentators relying on early case law to be wary about imposing modern 
notions of rights and judicial review onto a wholly different legal culture. Some 
inter-generational translation, in short, is necessary to use historical guideposts 
to decipher the scope and limits of the Second Amendment right. 
All of the articles in this symposium make original and important 
contributions to the still-developing field of firearms law. With the Supreme 
Court seemingly poised to reengage with the Second Amendment after nearly a 
decade of silence, this kind of scholarship will continue to make an impact on the 
direction of the law. 
 
 
 43.  Saul Cornell, History, Text, Tradition, and the Future of Second Amendment Jurisprudence: 
Limits on Armed Travel Under Anglo-American Law, 1688–1868, 83 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 
2020, at 73.  
 44.  Joyce Lee Malcolm, The Right to Carry Your Gun Outside: A Snapshot History, 83 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 195.  
 45.  Jud Campbell, Natural Rights, Positive Rights, and the Right to Keep and Bear Arms, 83 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 3, 2020, at 31.  
